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Puerto Rican

A

Politics in

Assessment

Preliminary

the United States

Jose E. Cru:

This article examines the following question:

What

characterizes Puerto Rican political

development and what promise does electoral politics hold for Puerto Ricans
United States?

Its

central premise

nomic deprivation and

is

that

in the

an analytical framework which focuses on eco-

and inadequate

an understanding of
the political experience of Puerto Ricans. Throughout the years, mainland Puerto

Ricans have moved

racial prejudice

is

partial

to

and out of the political stage holding the banners of antic olonialism, separatism, incorporation, and ethnic identity in search of vantage points from
which they can satisfy their cultural, social, and economic needs. Despite the Airbus and
circular migration, Puerto Ricans are part of established, stable, and integrated commuother words, they are a group that has been consistently interested in improv-

nities; in

ing

its

in

socioeconomic status through electoral politics. There

however, a negative

is,

corollary to this premise: while strong evidence suggests that electoral politics matters

and does make a
ed groups,

this

does not seem to

that electoral politics offers

approach
qualities

to the question

and

the

chances and actual progress of previously excludbe true for Puerto Ricans. But while this would indicate

difference in the

life

an empty promise, there are reasons that suggest a

of political representation, namely, focusing

different

on the leadership

demographic and political context necessary for success.

The history of Latinos in the United States has been characterized as one of "open
conflict,

economic deprivation, and

racial prejudice.

Ricans, and Cubans share this overall framework."

!

.

.

.

Mexican-Americans, Puerto

Within that framework, Mexican-

American history has received special attention and emphasis, partly because MexicanAmerican problems allegedly "foreshadow those of all Hispanics." 2
This is surely a partial and inadequate framework for understanding Latino politics in
the United States.

because

It is

particularly inadequate for an analysis of Puerto Rican politics

neither captures nor does justice to the richness and complexity of the Puerto

it

Rican experience. That experience includes, without a doubt, the aforementioned
ments, but

also registers instances of intergroup cooperation

it

and

ele-

solidarity, social

progress, and political incorporation.

Mexican- Americans represent the oldest Latino group
experience

is

not that of other Latino subgroups.

because scholars often give

it

no more than

It is

is

States.

lip service.

their

For example, no other Latino
.

.

.

labor wars, orga

assistant professor of Political Science, University at Albany, State University
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But

important to emphasize this point

subgroup has experienced "expulsions, deportations, lynchings
Jose E. Cruz

United

in the

ofNewYork
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of Public Policy

"Early in the 1990s, Puerto Ricans used reapportionment and
redistricting to increase their level

tation.

Now

of political represen-

they must turn to other strategies. These include

enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, increasing the

number of Puerto Ricans who run for
the

number of those who

vote. In light

office,

and increasing

of marked demo-

graphic dispersion, Puerto Ricans will have to build more

and

better coalitions with African-Americans, whites,

and

others, as they

like

Massachusetts and Connecticut."

have done

brilliantly in the

past

in

places

— Jose E. Cruz

200

3
nized banditry, filibustering expeditions, and three formal wars." Also, no other group

has dominated the political

life

New Mexico

of an American state as Latinos in

did

4

Only the experience of Puerto Ricans on their island parallels this
one, but the similarities are superficial and the comparison inappropriate. In short, a
historical characterization suggesting that the Mexican- American experience is paradigmatic stretches the limits of comparative analysis and uses a lens that distorts the image
for three generations.

of Latino political development.

The

analysis of Latino politics in the United States requires a

synthesis of Latino historical development that builds

new account and

upon a polythematic

a

new

interpretive

framework. Such analysis must identify the factors that have contributed to the forma-

community based on

tion of a Latino

the elaboration of the following themes: the rela-

tionship between separatist and accommodationist tendencies as strategies to promote

policy responsiveness, anticolonialism and

anticommunism

as political mobilization

strategies, and the politicization of ethnicity as a strategy for socioeconomic progress

and

political incorporation.

I

contend that these broad themes are the fundamental

ments of an integrative dynamic of
gence of a new American
In this context,

political

ele-

development which foreshadows the emer-

identity.

what characterizes Puerto Rican

political

development and what

promise does electoral politics hold for Puerto Ricans in the United States? The central
premise of

this article is that,

with the probable exception of anticommunism, the

themes cited above articulate the political experience of Puerto Ricans in the United
States.

Throughout the years, mainland Puerto Ricans have moved

political stage holding the

permanent space, a vantage point or points from which

they can satisfy their cultural, social, and economic needs.

and

and out of the

banners of anticolonialism, separatism, incorporation, and

ethnic identity in search of a

dence in support of

in

this contention

I

have arrayed below the

evi-

under three categories: incorporation, separatism,

identity.

I

emphasize the notion of permanent space

we

cular migration,

are looking at individuals

to suggest that, despite the

who

Airbus and

cir-

are part of established, stable, and

integrated communities; in other words, they are a group that has been consistently
interested in improving

its

socioeconomic

status

through electoral

politics.

But there

is

a

negative corollary to this premise: while strong evidence suggests that electoral politics

make

matters and does

excluded groups,

5

this

a difference in the

life

chances and actual progress of previously

does not seem to be true for Puerto Ricans

— or Latinos —

at

least not yet.

The evidence

that buttresses these claims

comes from two

sources: research on

Puerto Rican political development in the city of Hartford, Connecticut, and two surveys

of Puerto Rican elected officials that

one

city

conducted in 1989 and 1992. 6 Because data from

cannot be used to generalize about Puerto Ricans in the United States,

assessment
ful

I

is,

as the title indicates, preliminary. Yet the Hartford experience

and refreshing because

it

is

my
both use-

provides a counterpoint to the tendency to see the U.S.

Puerto Rican experience as the

New York

experience writ large. The surveys, on the

other hand, give us an image of Puerto Rican political representation that can be correlated with their

Hartford

is

socioeconomic

status.

a medium-size city with a population of 140,000. According to the 1990

number about 40,000, or 27 percent of the total. Proportionally,
Puerto Rican community in the United States. New York City com-

census, Puerto Ricans
this is the largest
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Table 1

U.S. Cities with Large Puerto Rican Concentrations, 1990

Percentage
State and City

Total Population

Puerto Ricans

3,485,398

14,367

0.4

141,686
139,739
130,474
75,491

30,250
38,176
13,866
10,325

21

7,322,564
231,636
188,082

896,763
16,383
14,420

12
7

87,492
110,002
228,537
275,221
140,891

22,984
12,062
30,950
41,545
27,580

26

574,283
70,207
156,983

25,767

4

14,661

21

23,729

15

505,616

17,829

4

1,585,577

67,857
11,612

4

78,380

358,548

72,827

20

2,783,726

119,866

4

of Total

California

Los Angeles
Connecticut
Bridgeport
Hartford

New Haven
New Britain

New York
New York

City

Rochester
Yonkers

New

27
11

14

8

Jersey

Camden
Elizabeth
Jersey City

Newark
Paterson

Massachusetts
Boston
Lawrence
Springfield

11

14
15

20

Ohio
Cleveland
Pennsylvania
Philadelphia

Reading
Florida

Miami
Illinois

Chicago

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990 Census of Population, unpublished data.

pares with only three of the twenty-one cities with the largest concentrations of Puerto

Ricans

— Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia — while Hartford

—Bridgeport, Connecticut,
Paterson,

New

Elizabeth,

New

Jersey,

Jersey, Springfield, Massachusetts,

New

comparable to

New York. In terms
New York has no

city,

of the

while Hartford compares with Bridgeport, Paterson, and to a lesser extent,

Springfield. Moreover, while

New York

make up more than 10 percent of

where Puerto Ricans
population, they comprise more than 10

City

the total

is

the only large city
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six

Haven, Connecticut,

and Yonkers,

proportion of the total Puerto Rican population of a big
parallel,

is

— those with between

percent of the population in eight of the ten medium-size cities

150,000 and 250,000 inhabitants. Their

total

number

in these ten cities, 218,158, ac-

counts for 8 percent of U.S. Puerto Ricans.

Incorporation
In the political science literature, the analysis of electoral participation

is

typically ex-

7
plained in reference to the social and psychological characteristics of voters.

An

elec-

composed of young, uneducated, and alienated people participates less than one
composed of older, better educated, and integrated individuals. In the case of Puerto
Ricans, this approach is offered in tandem with the observation that their interest in
torate

8

the island politics of Puerto Rico has affected their interest in mainland politics, effec9

dynamic has been synthesized in the
on Puerto Rican politics in terms of two distinctions: the first refers to differ10
ences between "migrants" and "citizens" and the second to the dilemma between
island- and mainland-based politics.
Concerning these issues, my research of Puerto Rican political development in
Hartford suggests that individual characteristics might be less important as determinants
of political participation than the structure of partisan and electoral options available
to voters. In Hartford, the political incorporation of Puerto Ricans was rapid largely
because the city Democratic Party was interested in mobilizing their support, even when
their numbers within the electorate were small. Ironically, the fact that the Democratic
tively reducing their level of participation. This
literature

11

Party dominated the city also helped, because in this context Puerto Ricans

felt

closer

home. Because almost all newcomers were supporters of the Partido Popular
Democratico in Puerto Rico, they readily identified with and sought membership in
Hartford's Democratic Party, assuming that the two organizations were similar in social
to

composition and goals. Education did have an impact on participation, but not in the
sense that the least educated were apathetic.
that the social

On

the contrary,

it

composition of the political leadership began to

was not until the 1970s
change from predomi-

nantly blue-collar and uneducated to predominantly white-collar and professional.

But even then,
ers. Instead,

this

low

quirements to

new

leadership mobilized a mass of mostly poor and uneducated vot-

levels of education

register,

were a barrier

in the context

teristics

re-

which, until their elimination in 1976, dampened participation.

In short, Puerto Rican political participation in Hartford
structure

of literacy

and dynamic of the

political

was determined more by

the

and electoral setting than by the individual charac-

of voters, a finding that has been noted elsewhere. 12

Political participation took off as early as 1955. In 1956, about

200 Puerto Ricans
13

was reported by the press with some surprise.
In that year, Puerto Rican numbers in Hartford were estimated at 2,000, which represented a 300 percent increase from an estimated 500 in 1954. Assuming that about
25 percent were qualified to vote, the registration level was 40 percent, a remarkable
proportion for a community in which at least 75 percent were recent arrivals. Over time,
registration and turnout have been low but electoral participation has been steady.
were registered

to vote, a fact that

In Hartford, the relationship between mainland- and island-based mobilization has

been complex, yet clearly

tilted

toward mainland-focused agendas. 14 The archives

of the Department of Puerto Rican

Community

monwealth of Puerto Rico contain a reference
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Affairs in the United States of the

to

com-

40 tobacco workers from the Hart-

New England Journal

who

ford area

of Public Policy

flew to Puerto Rico allegedly to vote in the 1960 general election. 15

In contrast, Puerto Ricans

who

settled in the city

never even considered voting in the

Puerto Rican election through absentee ballots; they visited their island, but more for

The community was not as interested as the
elite in Hartford's electoral politics, but this was dictated more by the conditions that
fostered disfranchisement than by an exclusive concern with homeland issues.
In 1986, a leading political action group, the Puerto Rican Political Action Committee of Connecticut, issued a resolution condemning as a civil rights violation the arrest
pleasure than out of an interest in politics.

of a group of independentistas in Puerto Rico. But one looks in vain for indications that
this case

moved

solidarity.

Hartford's Puerto Rican

The campaign of the

community beyond a sporadic expression of
and

local socialists

their allies to free those arrested

and

was marginal.
1989-1990 debate on the proposed plebiscite on the status of Puerto Rico
raised the question whether mainland Puerto Ricans should be allowed to vote, the overwhelming consensus in the community was that they should. In a New York policy
forum, Edwin Vargas, Jr., a local leader, presented a spirited argument for participation,
but he was then representing the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, a group
with a programmatic interest in the status issue whose main agenda is nonetheless
focused on issues that affect mainland Puerto Ricans. Still, Vargas began his presentation by regretting that the status issue had once again surfaced to "threaten unity in our
to publicize the island's colonial status

When

the

community." 16 In the same breath he suggested that the issue might be of ephemeral concern.

The idea of a

plebiscite, in fact,

Congress killed the

initiative,

was forced upon Congress by

mainland

elsewhere went on with their lives and

interest faded. Puerto

elite

island leaders; once

Ricans in Hartford and

concerns went back to mainland policy and

17

power issues.
The Hartford case
"citizen"

is

also suggests that although the distinction

sociologically adequate

and seasonal farmworkers,
cal

it

in explaining differences

nic awareness and

between urban dwellers

does not adequately represent stages in a process of

development entailing a mental and

active participation.

between "migrant" and

attitudinal transition leading

from marginality

leader put
.

.

to

A better characterization is provided by the distinction between eth-

power awareness.

Ethnic awareness in Hartford has been an expression of otherness.

Ricans.

politi-

As

a

community

"The Hartford community must understand Puerto Ricans as Puerto
Yes, we are Americans, but we don't look like Americans. Americans must

it,

.

18

Power awareness refers to the crystallization of an attitude. "From now on," declared another community leader in the wake of
two waves of rioting by Puerto Ricans in 1969, "we are going to show [everyone] that
look for what the Puerto Rican has to

we

are not only here, but that

offer."

we want improvements

.

.

.

We plan to

follow through

with our plans of bettering and upgrading the whole concept of the Puerto Rican around
the state."

19

Such has been the framework of
defined
actors

at

various

come

to

political participation that has

moments by a sense of

be favored by the

self

been constant and

and by a sense of how other

political

polity.

Separatism

While among Puerto Rican

activists

independence seems to be the preferred solution to

the colonial status of Puerto Rico, a majority feels that the U.S. Puerto Rican population

204

predominantly favors a permanent relationship between the island and the United States.

These sentiments came
Institute for Puerto

two surveys conducted by the New York-based
1988 and 1989. According to the 1988 poll, 44 per-

to the fore in

Rican Policy in

cent of Puerto Rican activists in the United States supported independence, while only

14 percent each supported statehood and the current commonwealth.

on the other hand, revealed

that

45 percent of Puerto Rican

ferred status of most mainland Puerto Ricans

cent believe that statehood

about independence.

is

activists

The 1989

survey,

agree that the pre-

continued commonwealth, while 30 per-

is

the preferred solution and only 14 percent think the

same

20

These findings are only suggestive, yet they are

in keeping with the results of the

Latino National Political Survey, which shows that a majority of mainland Puerto

Ricans (69.4%) prefer commonwealth as the permanent status of Puerto Rico. In contrast,

only 27 percent of respondents supported statehood, and a low 3.5 percent pre-

ferred independence.

21

"How

Moreover, in response to the question

strong

is

your love

for the United States?" 31.5 percent of Puerto Ricans said "extremely strong"

and 37.1

percent said "very strong"; only 8.1 percent responded "not very strong." To the question

"How

proud are you to be an American?" 38.5 percent responded "extremely

proud" and 44.6 percent said "very proud."
dents, said they

The

A tiny minority,

were "not very proud" of their

citizenship.

only 2.3 percent of respon-

22

history of Puerto Rican separatism in the United States

timents. Hartford Puerto Ricans

members of the Puerto Rican
pendence

came

into the public eye

tune with these sen-

is in

on March

2,

1954,

when

four

Nationalist Party took their claims for Puerto Rican inde-

directly to the U.S. Congress, not in the

form of a signed

petition nor through

a formal process of consultation, but with guns in their hands.

The nationalists wanted to alert the world that Puerto Rico was not the showcase of
democracy touted by the United States at the United Nations and elsewhere in Latin
America but a colony of an imperial power. The United States was not Puerto Rico's
senior partner but

its ruler. It

had masterminded and controlled the repression of pro-

independence advocates on the island, of which the most visible example was the jailing
in a federal prison of the nationalist leader

The

reactions to the shooting, however,

Pedro Albizu Campos.

were highly unsympathetic. In Puerto Rico

and Washington the attack was characterized as "savage and unbelievable lunacy" 23 and
contrary to our belief and our peaceful nature, an instance of "the misbehavior of a very
few."

24

In

New York,

Felipe N. Torres, a Puerto Rican assemblyman from the Bronx,

introduced a resolution condemning the shooting, which the state assembly approved. 25

And

in Illinois, a

group of twenty-one Puerto Ricans presented themselves

at

Hines

Maywood, a suburb of Chicago, to donate blood as a gesture of
wounded representatives. "We want to show the American people that

Veterans Hospital in

sympathy

for the

the people of Puerto Rico do not hate them," said Luis Martinez, a

"The

nationalists are not representative of our native country.

zens."

We

bodega operator.
are proud to be citi-

26

The day
Ricans,

after the shooting, the

Few

in

Hartford Times ran a story

Number, Deplore Shootings." In

it

titled

"Local Puerto

Julio Falcon, a Puerto Rican

li-

aison officer for tobacco workers, expressed his dismay over the incident. Defined as
transient tobacco

the shooting.
fire chiefs

The

and apple harvesters, Puerto Ricans were said
report included a message

from the

fire

to

be unhappy about

chief of Puerto Rico to "the

of every town and city in the United States," reassuring them that "the vast

majority of the people of Puerto Rico are indignant at the unbelievable and criminal
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aggression of which the

members of the United

States

Congress have been victims." 27

During the 1970s, the Hartford Puerto Rican community,
communities, experienced a surge in radical political
Party

(PLP) — a clone of

the Young Lords Party

like

acticity.

most U.S. Puerto Rican

The People's

— erupted onto

Liberation

the political scene in

1970, and a year later the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP), which operated throughout
the Northeast, began its activities in the city. While the PLP vanished rather quickly,

PSP was

was never fully accepted by the community
and by the mid-1970s it divided and broke apart. The most notorious separatist event
in local politics took place in 1983, when the group Los Macheteros stole over $7 million from a Wells Fargo branch in West Hartford. The key operative in the heist was
the

active for several years. Yet

it

Victor Gerena, a second-generation Puerto Rican Hartfordian born in the Bronx. But in
his chronicle

completely overshadowed
Gerena's

how

of the episode, Fernandez shows

feat,

its

political intent.

symbolism of the robbery
Puerto Ricans, and others, cheered
the class

not because they sympathized with his separatist politics, but because

it

was a Robin Hood sort of adventure; they were in awe of him because he represented a
working-class David who had inflicted severe damage on a greedy, capitalistic Goliath. 28

Identity
Identity politics in Hartford has

been both an expressive process and one in which prior

organization and instrumental rationality played a significant role.
not driven solely by cost-benefit calculations; rationality

was

29

also mediated

chosocial factors. Moreover, the purposive defense of identity (that
for example, the Puerto

Mobilization was

is,

Rican parade, which in Hartford dates from

1

by psy-

ethnic awareness;

964) rather than

collapsing into a solipsistic exercise (for example, overemphasis on Puerto Rican pride)
led to the pursuit of concrete political advantages (for example, seeking representation

through extra-partisan organization and mobilization).

Although the desire for economic betterment was

there, the earliest

forms of Puerto

Rican association were religious and cultural. Examples include the Legion de Maria
(Legion of Mary) and the Rosario Cantado (Sung Rosary) that Olga Mele, probably the
first

Puerto Rican to

move

to Hartford in 1941, joined

1950s, the baseball leagues that various

parade
tives,

itself,

leaders organized, the Puerto Rican

however, cut across their constitutive boundaries and spilled over into

opened

in the

the San Juan Bautista and Park Street festivals, and so on. These initia-

When La Popular, Bodega
itics.

community

and founded, respectively,

in 1956,

it

Hispana, the

first

politics.

Puerto Rican restaurant in the

city,

quickly became the meeting place for Puerto Ricans interested in pol-

Their purpose was not to plot strategies to fight corporate power but to penetrate

and to fight City Hall if necessary. The interest of early leaders in
was never strong; educational policy, particularly bilingual education, provided the focus for their activities. Many were convinced that politics was important for
the community without really knowing exactly why. Politics was seen not as the pursuit
of abstract goods but as the means to achieve a citizens' agenda whose goals were
defined by ethnic needs. While community as well as elite concerns did not center
around issues of "industry and idleness," 30 identity was intertwined with status.
Employment and unionization issues were there, but always in the background. As a
matter of fact, a key question that observers asked was whether Puerto Ricans would

the Democratic Party
class issues

ever tackle issues other than those related to their culture.

Even leaders with

socialist credentials

and

links to the labor

206

movement recognized

that ethnicity

was a

crucial mobilizing factor, even if they tinted their rhetoric with a bit

of class analysis. Thus, in
didates listed

on row B

many

electoral campaigns, support for Puerto Rican can-

in the ballot

was sought by using the slogan "Vota por

Boricua" (Vote for row B, for Boricua), Boricua being another

la

way of referring

B

de

to a

member of the group.
Was this an opportunistic utilization of ethnicity to advance economic interests?
Many have made this claim about the relationship between ethnicity and status. David
Ward summarizes this view when he writes,
Ethnicity

is

a label to describe reactive responses of interest groups that have

perceived detrimental alterations in the allocation principles of public policies.

Their political loyalties do not, therefore, reflect their interests in ancestral
foreign causes but rather their concern over threats to their well-being from

competing

interest groups.

31

Ethnic identity, however, need not be exclusively or predominantly related to a concern with an ancestral homeland to be authentic. This

American

context,

where one finds dissonance between

identity attachments suggest

ancestral roots,

33

more an accumulation of

Gurak and

Kritz, for

cultural capital than a return to

its

34

To be

to adopt ethnic

sure, ethnicity has

distinctiveness

is

psychological

example, compared Puerto Ricans with Hispanic

immigrants to the Northeast in the 1970s to find
tity in

and ancestry, 32 where

identity

would otherwise not think about.

socioeconomic referents, but these are contingent;
cultural.

particularly true in the

and where individuals are often externally prompted

classifications that they

and

is

that,

among

Puerto Ricans, ethnic iden-

the second generation correlated with low socioeconomic status. 35 Rogler,

Cooney, and Ortiz, on the other hand, found
higher levels of acculturation

among

that ethnic identity

was strong regardless of

second-generation Puerto Rican families. 36 While

these findings are problematic, they do suggest that ethnic identity

is

a complex process

with a wide range of expressions from ancestral callings to leisure-time pursuits. 37 For

Hartford Puerto Ricans, identity coincided with ancestry,

and

tion,

its

symbolism was public and

it

cut across class and genera-

politically powerful.

38

Electoral Politics
This leads us to the question of electoral politics and

its

promise. Between 1989 and

1992, Puerto Rican communities across the country witnessed a surge in political activity

and involvement

at all levels.

The most notable

Congress of two Puerto Ricans, one each from
active in the

New York

was their election to
York. They were also

result of this

Illinois

and

New

City charter revision process and the redistricting process in the

Northeast.

Puerto Ricans

made

significant strides in running for local offices. In

New York

City,

where they were 12 percent of the population, they captured 16 percent of the City
Council
city

seats. In Hartford,

they held three votes in the coalition of five that controlled

government during the 1991-1993 term. At the time, the

office of the corporation

counsel, the city's lawyer, and the Democratic Party organization in the city were

presided over by Puerto Ricans.

But

in

1

989 the central

fact

concerning Puerto Rican electoral politics was underrep-
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Table 2

Puerto Rican Elected Officials as a Percentage
of Popularly Elected Officials

19,279
9,929
5,368
38,936
11,355
13,888
19,292
9,345
26,343
19,750
33,242

California

Connecticut
Florida
Illinois

Indiana

Massachusetts
Michigan
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Total

United States
Federal Officials

Percentage

Puerto Rican

Total

State

Puerto Rican
Percentage
of State
Population

03

*

+

15
02

*

04
02

08
02
04

*

*

1.2

#

+

*

2.4

01

*

+

25

*

71

*

04
06

05
07

*

+

*

1.2

206,737
504,404

143
143

540

4a

02
1.1

Sources: Jose E. Cruz, 1992 elected officials survey; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Popularly Elected Officials in 1987, Preliminary Report, GC87-2(P), December 1988.
a Includes Puerto Rico's resident

commissioner

in

Washington.

* Less than one-tenth of one percent.
+ Less than one percent.

resentation.

New

Jersey,

By

1983, three states with large Puerto Rican concentrations

and

New York

— had

—

Illinois,

six congressional districts with Latino proportions

ranging from 26 to 51 percent. This circumstance was considered favorable to the
election of an ethnic candidate, possibly a Puerto Rican.

come

But by 1989

this

had not

about.

1989 Survey
The 1 989 survey
states

39

identified

1

23 elected

of Puerto Rican background in eleven

officials

with Puerto Rican populations of 10,000 or more

Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,

Pennsylvania. With 74 percent of
states in 1980,

it

was reasonable

all

to

—

New

California, Connecticut,

Jersey,

New York,

Ohio, and

Puerto Ricans in the United States living in those

compare the

level of representation there against the

total

number of elected

total

U.S. population but less than one-tenth of one percent of

officials in the country.

Puerto Ricans were one percent of the
all

elected public office-

holders in the fifty states. Puerto Ricans represented 1.6 percent of the total population
in the states

mentioned above, but again,

less than one-tenth of

one percent of

all

elected

officials.

Compared with
percent of
officials.

all

Latinos, Puerto Ricans were

still

underrepresented.

Latinos in the surveyed states but only 17 percent of

all

They were 21
Latino elected

Considering only those states where Puerto Rican numbers were highest,
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Table 3

Puerto Rican Elected Officials (PREO) as a Percentage
of Hispanic Elected Officials (HEO)
Pue rto Rican
Percentage
of State

State

HEO

California

617

03

+

1.7

17

88

69

60
139
09
04

15
02

3.3

08
02
04

06
22
100

16
17
14

12

01

8.3

Connecticut
Florida
Illinois

Indiana

Massachusetts
Michigan
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Total

Sources:

PREO

Percentage

Pop ulation

53
09
42
49

42

25

60

76
08
09

71

93.4

05
07

63
78

3.5

993

143

14.4

17.5

NALEO, 7557 National Roster of Hispanic Elected

Officials;

Jose

E. Cruz,

65

1992 elected

officials sur-

vey; U.S. Bureau of the Census.

+ Less than one percent.

the comparison

was more

favorable. In Connecticut, Puerto Ricans

the Latino population but 99 percent of

were 50 percent of

all

all

Latino elected

Still,

New

Jersey, they

Latinos but 60 percent of Latinos elected to public office. In

York, where Puerto Ricans were 59 percent of

Latino elected

were 71 percent of

officials. In

all

Latinos, they were 79 percent of

New
all

officials.

while they constituted 4.4 percent of the

they were less than one-half of one percent of

1992 Survey
Although it is widely acknowledged

all

total

public officeholders.

that redistricting

for Puerto Ricans, the aggregate gains

were not

population in those three states,

brought increased representation

significant

enough

to achieve parity.

The

survey conducted in 1992 identified 143 elected officials of Puerto Rican background in
the eleven states of the 1989 survey, an increase of twenty officials, or 16.2 percent.

Currently,
states.

While

90 percent of
in

all

Puerto Ricans in the U.S. mainland live in these eleven

1990 Puerto Ricans exceeded one percent of the

for the first time, in

1992 they were

less

total

U.S. population

than one-tenth of one percent of the total num-

ber of popularly elected officials in the country. In the eleven states with Puerto Rican
representation, they

were 2 percent of the

total

population in 1990 but less than one-

tenth of one percent of all elected officials.

In 1989, Puerto Ricans,
states

by four percentage

compared with Latinos, were underrepresented

points. In

in the eleven

1992 the gap widened, the Puerto Rican proportion

of Latinos being 17.5 percent compared with 8.2 percent of Latino elected officials.

This was partly owing to the inclusion of Chicago school council members in the total

number of

Illinois officials.
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Table 4

Puerto Ricans as a Percentage of Hispanics and Hispanic Elected Officials
(HEO) in States with Largest Puerto Rican Concentrations
1989
Percentage

Gap

Percentage

ofHisp
Connecticut
New Jersey
New York

1992

of

+28
+10
+20

99
60
79

71

50
59

Percentage
Hisp

HEO

Gap

Percentage
of

69
42
49

HEO
+19.0
+18.0
+44.4

88.0
60.0
93.4

Sources: Jose E. Cruz, 1989 and 1992 elected officials survey; National Puerto Rican Coalition, Puerto
Ricans in the U.S. Mainland: A Special Report Based on the 1990 Decennial Census (June 1992).

Puerto Ricans do

much

most populous

better in the

69 percent of Latinos but 88 percent of Latino elected
Jersey,the proportions

were 42 percent and 60 percent,

states. In

Connecticut, they were

New
And in New York,

officials in 1992; in

respectively.

Puerto Ricans were 49 percent of Latinos but 78 percent of Latino elected

Table 3 summarizes

surveyed

this correlation for the

states.

changes in the overrepresentation margin in Connecticut,

were

New

in part the result of decreases in the percentage of Puerto

New

states. In

slightly in

tandem with a

slightly. In

Jersey,

and

New York

Rican Latinos

in those

margin increased by eleven points even

Jersey, the overrepresentation

though representation decreased

officials.

Table 4 shows, however, that

Connecticut, the margin increased

slight increase in representation.

But in

New York,

a decrease

in the proportion of Puerto

Rican Latinos correlated with significant increases in the

number of elected

and the overrepresentation margin.

officials

In absolute terms, the balance
its

was

positive for the years 1989-1992.

But Indiana saw

more than 50 percent and New Jersey lost one representawhose Puerto Rican population grew by 158.6 percent during 1980-1990,

representation shrink by

tive. Florida,

re-ported no net gains in representation. In Massachusetts, the Puerto Rican population

grew by 102 percent and gained one elected

official.

This balance, however, obscures

the fact that Puerto Ricans lost their only representative at the state level, the Honorable

Nelson Merced. Although California, Connecticut, and Ohio had net gains,

New York

recorded the largest gain, with an increase in Puerto Rican representation of 3 1 .4 percent, a direct result of the
trates the

At the

New York

City charter revision redistricting. Table 5 illus-

changes in representation by

state.

federal level, Puerto Rican representation

more than doubled. Counting

resident commissioner of Puerto Rico in Washington, Puerto Ricans comprise

cent of Latinos in the

House of Representatives

(4 of 17). Island

Ricans constitute 24 percent of U.S. Latinos.

If the resident

the Puerto Rican proportion of Latinos in the

House decreases

the

24 per-

and mainland Puerto

commissioner

is

excluded,

to 17.6 percent; but this

share goes beyond parity, since mainland Puerto Ricans are only 12.2 percent of the

22.4 million Latinos counted by the 1990 census.
In 1992, Puerto
officials
total

moved

Rican representation

in

Congress as a percentage of federal elected

a bit closer to parity compared with the Puerto Rican proportion of the

U.S. population (1.1%), with 0.7 percent of

half of one percent in 1989.
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all officials,

compared with

less than

Table 5

Puerto Rican Elected Officials by State, 1989 and 1992

California
Florida
Illinois

Indiana

Massachusetts
Michigan
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania

Source: Jose

E.

Cruz, 1989

+01
00
00

2

8

1

Totals

+02

3
15

1

14
2
8
5
3

Connecticut

Change

1992

1989

State

2

-03

4

+01
00

1

26
54

25

-01

71

2
7

7

+17
+03
00

123

14

+20

5

and 1992 elected

officials

surveys.

Table 6

and Puerto Rican Population of Jurisdictions
with Puerto Rican Political Representation, 1990

Total, Hispanic,

City

Puerto
Rican

Puerto Rican
Percentage

Puerto Rican
Percentage
of Hispanic

Total

Hispanic

723,959
782,248

100,717
208,388

4,701

*

4.6

4,472

*

2.1

141,686
139,739
75,491
130,474
14,746

37,547
44,137
12,284
17,243
2,343

30,250
38,176
10,325
13,866

21.3
27.3
13.6
10.6

1,942

13.1

80.5
86.4
84.0
80.4
82.8

164,693
13,909

14,401
12,938

7,035

4.2

338

2.4

48.8
2.6

2,783,726
39,408

545,852

119,866
139

4.3

21.9

*

12.7

33,892
13,899

16,196
1,834

3,446

10.1

748

5.3

21.2
40.7

of Total

California

San Francisco 3
San Jose

Connecticut
Bridgeport
Hartford

New Britain
New Haven
Willimantic b
Florida

Orlando
Sweetwater
Illinois

Chicago

Lombard
Indiana
East Chicago
Lake Station

1,090
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continued

Total

City

Puerto
Rican

Hispanic

Puerto Rican
Percentage
of Total

Puerto Rican
Percentage
of Hispanic

Massachusetts

Amherst b
Chelsea
Holyoke

17,824
28,170
43,704

679

260

1.4

38.2

9,018
13,573

4,581
12,687

16.2

29.0

50.7
93.4

32,196

399

35

*

8.7

87,492
24,850
33,397
228,537
10,639
58,041
40,891
41,967
54,780
2,678

27,273
3,893
10,036
55,395

22,984

26.2
02.3

57,711

6,833
30,950
450
11,626
27,580

23,310
12,926
441

13,531
11,672
361

84.2
14.9
68.0
55.8
73.8
40.0
47.7
58.0
90.2
81.8

45,218
1,203,789

15,692
523,111
16,129

8,203
349,115
12,798

462,411

386,630
381,120

274,530
896,763
154,978
100,410

378,977
231,636

30,239
20,055

17,730
16,383

7.0

505,616
71,245

23,197
12,065

17,829
9,382

13.1

10,405
52,376
1,585,577
78,380

914

805

7.7

4,022
89,193
14,486

3,051

67,857
11,612

05.8
04.2
14.8

16,094,176

3,238,525

1,424,120

88.8

Michigan

Madison Heights

New

Jersey

Camden
Englewood
Hoboken
Jersey City

Mount

Holly
Passaic
Paterson
Perth Amboy

Vineland

Woodbine d

New

583

609
29,028

20.4
13.5
4.2

20.0
19.5
32.2
21.3
13.4

York

Brentwood
Bronx County
13

Buffalo

328,123

29.0

52.2
66.7

3.9

79.3

11.9

59.3
50.2
40.0
26.3

18.1

Kings County
(Brooklyn)

New
New

York City e
York County

Queens County
Richmond County
(Staten Island)

Rochester

2,300,664
7,322,564
1,487,536
1,951,598

1,783,511

12.2

10.4
5.1

4.6

58.6
81.6

Ohio
Cleveland
Lorain

3.5

76.8
77.7

Pennsylvania
Bristold

Harrisburg
Philadelphia

Reading
Totals

88.0
75.8
76.0
80.1

43.9

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990 Census of Population, unpublished data.
a County.

^Census designated place; these are closely settled population centers without
State and local officials delineate CDPs following Census Bureau guidelines.
c Village.

"Borough.
e Numbers not included

in total.

*Less than one percent.
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legally established limits.

Constituencies and Public Policy Priorities
Puerto Rican elected officials serve large and diverse constituencies. Fourteen percent of

respondents serve populations numbering between 50,000 and 100,000, and a

full

50

percent serve constituencies of more than 100,000. Almost half serve constituencies that

more than 50 percent Latino; of these, 52 percent serve constituencies that are more
than 50 percent Puerto Rican. Only 30 percent of respondents serve voters who are more
are

than 50 percent non-Hispanic white, and a small proportion, 9 percent, serve constituen-

more than 50 percent African- American. A full 30 percent, however, serve
constituencies that are between 20 percent and 40 percent non-Hispanic white, and 63
percent serve voters who are between 20 percent and 40 percent African- American.
cies that are

Education
officials,

is

the single

but there

is

most important public policy

no single focus on

(51.4% of the total) listing education
fied the focus of their interest,

this issue.

at the

(25% of the

Of the

fifty-four respondents

top of their agenda, 61 percent further speci-

which included everything from bilingual education

to dropout prevention to physical plant issues.
six respondents

priority of respondent elected

total) listing

it

as

Housing came next, but with only twentya priority; it was followed by eco-

nomic development, with twenty-one respondents indicating
Rican elected

officials, the

it

as an issue.

For Puerto

top six public policy issues are, in rank order, education,

housing, economic development, health care, crime prevention, and civil rights.

Presumably, these issues provided the campaign themes on which the

officials

were

elected and should provide the criteria of evaluation of their performance.

Representation and Socioeconomic Status
It is

not possible to provide an adequate evaluation of that performance in this review,

except indirectly. The 1990 census shows that the labor-market performance and

socioeconomic status of Puerto Ricans were mixed during the 1980s, marked by both
progress and stagnation. However, there are no indicators to support a positive correlation

between

political representation

and socioeconomic

status.

The

available evi-

dence suggests that during the 1980s, Puerto Rican progress and stagnation were functions of
tics,

economic growth, differences

and migration

status.

40

individual capabilities and
relation

between

in regional

economies, human-capital characteris-

Yet because public policy often moves in the interstices of

economic conditions, some inferences can be made about the
and socioeconomic status.

political representation

Between 1979 and 1989, the mean annual household income of Puerto Ricans
increased by 25 percent, from $23,463 to $29,264. Similarly, the mean per capita household income grew by 29 percent, from $6,490 to $8,370, with the margin between
household and per capita income accounted for by reductions in the size of the average
household. 41 On the other hand, the income gap between Puerto Ricans and non-Hispanic whites continued to be enormous, with Puerto Ricans earning only fifty-three

by non-Hispanic whites in 1989. While the poverty rate
among Puerto Ricans decreased from 36.4 percent in 1980 to 30.3 percent in 1990, it
was still more than double the rate for the population as a whole and six percentage
cents for every dollar earned

points higher than the rate for Latinos. 42

This situation suggests that in the absence of public policies which target Puerto

Rican needs, some Puerto Ricans experience increases
poverty, in keeping with increases in

economic
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activity

in earnings

and move out of

and gains in human

capital,
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while others continue to experience economic and social disadvantage. Indeed, reduc-

unemployment, and between
Puerto Rican unemployment correlated with

tions in poverty rates are associated with decreases in

March 1986 and March 1989, decreases
occupational patterns

shifts in

in

— from blue-

creases in educational attainment.

43

What

to white-collar occupations

means

this

that Puerto

is

— and

in-

Rican elected

offi-

saddled with the central responsibility of supporting and effecting two kinds of

cials are

public policies: those which promote economic growth and those which enable individu-

reap the benefits of growing economic environments.

als to

would be tempting at this point to conclude that political representation has
failed to deliver on its promise of progress for Puerto Ricans, three major reasons suggest a different approach. First, electoral politics matters. When the face of power
While

it

changes, public policy changes in tandem. Yet simple representation

is

successful, political representation requires a certain kind of leadership
tain

not enough; to be

and a

cer-

kind of demographic and political context. Leaders must be honest, committed, en-

ergetic,

and smart; 44 emerging constituencies must be demographically strong. At a

minimum, access
mally,

it

must

to governing bodies

entail control of crucial

must

translate into significant influence and, opti-

decision-making structures;

finally,

public opinion

must favor the direction sought for public policy, and local policy responsiveness must
45
be matched by state and federal support. This is a complex set of requirements, but it
nonetheless provides a realistic prescription for success in electoral politics.

Second, the system
nists.

is

relatively open, so that outcasts

The conventional wisdom about

congressional decision making. If this
lic policy, political

representation

is

interest groups in
is true,

can and do become protago-

America

is

the logical corollary

that they control

is

pub-

that to control

unnecessary. Indeed, by this logic government

is

simply the executive committee of the best-organized and most resourceful group.

But the conventional wisdom about

interest

groups

is,

in fact, not true.

The pressure

sys-

46

tem in the United States has been charged with having a definite "upper class bias,"
which has contributed to an image of homogeneity of interests, structure, goals, and
effectiveness that does not jibe with the reality. The system is, instead, "conflictual, per47
meable, [and] unpredictable," marked by different rates of success among groups
and by a curious inability of any one group to seize control of the public policy
agenda. 48 This agenda is susceptible to external input, but it is ultimately controlled by
those who hold public office. If this were not the case the pressure system would not be
necessary; but it is the case, and more important, control of public office is not beyond
the scope of possibilities for Puerto Ricans locally or at the national level.

Third, public policy

makes a

difference.

When

early

on

in his presidency,

Ronald

Reagan stated that in the 1960s we declared a war on poverty and poverty won, he
was making a case against public policy. In fact, in what amounted to a rekindling of
1960s Cold War liberalism, Reagan was telling the American people to "ask not
what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country." The corollary
question here

is,

Who

should not ask for governmental favors? The construction and

automotive interests that benefited from the creation of the interstate highway system?

The homeowners who were rewarded with
ans

who were

not,"

whom

and no one ever suggested
to

The

veter-

given access to higher education through the GI bill? Clearly, these are

sectors of the population for

doomed

the mortgage interest deduction?

to

public policy did work.

them

that

They were never

government responses

to social

told to "ask

needs are

fail.

The problem

in the

United States, however,
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is

not one of failed public policies but of

them in the first place; we are at fault by omission rather than
by commission. During the 1980s, tax and transfer systems in seven Western European
countries cushioned the effects of economic change on the incomes of their citizens;
this did not happen in the United States, where the absence of subsidized child care, the
49
failure to expand the earned income tax credit, and heavy reliance on means-tested
a failure to establish

benefits

were contributing

factors to the country's inability to provide

economic security

France and the United Kingdom, about 50 percent of house-

to families with children. In

holds headed by young adults were lifted out of poverty by tax and transfer programs
in the first half of the 1980s, but the

Thus,
cess

it is

clear that

United States experienced no such reductions. 50

government intervention

— of representation

is

relative to the

is

not futile and that the failure

philosophy and interests of those

— or

who

suc-

control

public office at any given time.

What Must Be Done?
Early in the 1990s, Puerto Ricans used reapportionment and redistricting to increase
their level of political representation.

Now

they must turn to other strategies. These

number of Puerto Ricans
who run for office, and increasing the number of those who vote. In light of marked
demographic dispersion, Puerto Ricans will have to build more and better coalitions
include enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, increasing the

with African-Americans, whites, and others, as they have done brilliantly in the past in
places like Massachusetts and Connecticut.

51

The key challenge that Puerto Rican elected officials face is how to translate access
into power in the context of small numbers, universalism in public policy, and
slow growth. Getting elected

is

only half the

game

— governing being

the other half.

Puerto Rican elected officials have their public policy priorities right, but the available

evidence strongly suggests that they are not having an impact on Puerto Rican problems.
al

Whether

this is

due

to structural factors

(economic restructuring, declining region-

economies), political factors (such as universalism and

pitfalls

of coalition-based

regimes), the characteristics of Puerto Rican elected officials (for example, a majority

of first-termers/mediocre leaders), or a combination of these and other factors, this
analysis cannot

tell.

One general prescription, however, seems appropriate. To be effective Puerto Ricans
must become full partners in the process whereby government develops working
and private centers of power. 52 The Hartford experience suggests

relations with public

be good brokers between public and private power if
component of public power shuts out the electorate. 53 But it is clear

that effective leaders cannot

the institutional

that

a concern with grassroots interests should not be equated with a rejection of private

power

as

Many

somehow

centuries ago, Aristotle dealt with the issue of pluralism and

political power. In
city

—

citizens

illegitimate.

The

Politics he wrote,

that is to say, the good, the rich

—

will there or will there not

to ask ourselves

how

ments are present

at

all

these to be present in a single

be dispute as to which should rule?

who

one and the same time." 54 Needless to

when he argued

to bring about its

relationship to

and the well-born, and beside them a mass of

to reach a conclusion [regarding

acceptable conclusion. Yet

depend on education

"Suppose

its

should rule]
say,

common

unity,"

.

.

We

have

these ele-

he did not reach an

that the "state is a plurality,
55

.

when

which must

he implicitly suggested that to

resolve these disputes, the integrity of the groups and interests in question need not be
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sacrificed. Puerto

Ricans should pay heed to this Aristotelian insight by recognizing that

without the cooperation of business and labor, insurance companies and nonprofit corporations, private lobbies

and public bureaucracies,

it is

unlikely that Puerto Ricans will be

able to legislate and implement the public policies needed to bring equality and progress
for all.**

This article

is

based on a paper

Rico, in April 1994. I

am

I presented at the University of the

grateful to Carlos Santiago

Sacred Heart, Santurce, Puerto
their comments.

and Todd Swanstrom for
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